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Abstract 
      The Japanese version of the Big Bang announced in November 1996 was a major plan to drastically reform 
the financial and capital markets in Japan through significant revisions to laws such as the Securities and 
Exchange Law. The Japanese Big Bang was planned because of mounting worries about the lowering of the 
international status of Japanese markets and deadlock of the existing financial structure which depended 
excessively on indirect financing, mainly of bank loans. 
   The Japanese Big Bang was supposed to have been completed by the end of March, 2001, but in reality 
system reforms for financial and capital markets are still continuing including revisions of the Securities and 
Exchange Law and of the taxation system of securities. Reform of the financial structure -- the goal of Big 
Bang -- has not made notable progress, an example being that most privately held financial assets are still in 
the form of deposits, because of the following reasons. 
    The first reason is that participation of individual investors in the security market has not significantly 
increased. This is due to lack of familiarity with security companies that broker investments in securities and 
lack of knowledge of the market and investments. 
      The second reason is that the use of financial and capital markets to procure funds is being hindered by 
the irrational behavior of banks, an example of which is the placement of loans at interest rates which are not 
commensurate with the risks involved. This is particularly problematic. It is necessary to reveal the values of 
securities in the trading market to the maximum extent and to promote conversion of bank credit into 
securities in order to normalize the behavior of banks. To bring this about it is necessary to strengthen 
supervision to prevent unjust behavior in the market in order to raise investor confidence in the market. 
   As a consequence of the Japanese Big Bang and subsequent reforms, the financial and capital market 
systems of Japan now bear comparison with those in the UK and the US, at least procedurally. However, the 
system reforms implemented in Japan may just become a state of tilling the ground and failing to sow if there 
is no change in the attitude of control that experts (including the managing authorities who design the 
systems) persist in maintaining and no change in the way of thinking of companies that regard procurement 
of funds in the market as merely being the means to make adjustments for bank borrowing. 
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I.    Japan's “Big Bang” and the Reforms Since   
 
      In November 1996 the then Prime Minister, Ryutaro Hashimoto, announced Japan's “Big Bang” 
program, aimed at solving the country's bad debt problem and reestablishing its financial markets 
on a par with those in New York and London by 2001, with the motto “Free, Fair and Global.” 
Following the publication in June 1997 of reports by three advisory panels (the Securities and 
Exchange Council, the Financial System Research Committee and the Insurance Council), the 
program was largely incorporated in the Financial System Reform Law, which was enacted in June 
1998 and came into effect in December of the same year. This comprehensive piece of legislation 
amended 24 related laws, including most sections of the Securities and Exchange Law and the 
Securities Investment Trust Law.   
      As its name suggests, Japan's Big Bang was modeled on the stock market reforms carried out in 
the United Kingdom 10 years earlier in 1986. There were two main reasons for the timing of the 
Japanese reform program. 
   First, there was a growing sense of crisis in Japan at the way the country's financial markets 
were losing their international status. In 1989 the Tokyo Stock Exchange overtook the New York 
Stock Exchange as the world's biggest stock market in terms of capitalization and trading volume. 
However, when Japan's boom of the late 1980s turned to bust in the early 1990s and the United 
States experienced a boom in information technology, the tables were turned. The position of 
Japan's financial markets was further undermined by developments such as an increase in the 
trading of Japanese equities on the London Stock Exchange and in the trading of Nikkei 225 
futures on Singapore's SIMEX as well as the continued departure of foreign companies from the 
Foreign Section of the Tokyo Stock Exchange .
1) 
   Although it is a moot question whether these developments were really symptomatic of a 
decline in the international status of Japan's financial markets, there is no doubt that they added to 
the pressure in Japan to do something to reverse the decline. It is interesting to note that the 
pressure for reform in the United Kingdom 10 years earlier was also partly the result of the loss of 
business to New York and the rapid growth of Tokyo as a financial center. Both Big Bangs were 
motivated largely by the desire to enhance the status of London and Tokyo as international 
financial centers.   
      The second main reason for the timing of the Japanese reform program was the realization that 
Japanese business had become handicapped by its traditional (over)reliance on “indirect” 
financing (i.e., bank lending). The system by which surplus money flowed from Japanese 
households via banks, the postal savings system and insurance companies to the cash-hungry 
corporate sector (both directly and via state owned financial institutions such as Japan 
Development Bank) had served the country well for many years. However, the banks found 
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themselves being increasingly deserted by their larger corporate customers, who had managed to 
build up their equity capital, and faced a mountain of bad debt when the property bubble burst 
leaving them with collateral worth less than their loans. As a result, they were no longer able to 
provide anything like enough capital for new businesses. The realization that Japan needed to 
radically reform its capital markets in order to make it easier for companies to raise capital by 
issuing shares and bonds (i.e., by means of “direct” financing) was a response to this situation. It is 
important to understand that the program to reform Japan's capital markets and the program to 
solve the country's bad debt problem were seen as inextricably linked.   
   However, as the reform program was implemented, the first of the two main driving forces 
behind it (i.e., the desire to restore the international status of the country's financial markets) 
gradually receded into the background while the second (i.e., the desire to redirect the flow of 
money in the economy) began to take center stage. Indeed, this trend is even more apparent in the 
various reforms that have followed the enactment of the Financial System Reform Law.   
      The first example of this is the May 2000 amendments to the Securities and Exchange Law, as 
a result of which stock exchanges were allowed to be for-profit corporations as well as traditional 
mutually owned membership organizations. The process by which a stock exchange could 
demutualize was also mapped out. And the Investment Trust Law was amended to enable new 
financial products such as real estate investment trusts (REITs) to be developed. These 
amendments were very much a tidying-up operation in the wake of Big Bang. Once Big Bang ended 
the ban on proprietary trading systems (or alternative trading systems), it was perhaps inevitable 
that the ban on for-profit stock exchanges should also be lifted. However, memories of pre-war 
days, when the for-profit nature of Japan's stock exchanges only exacerbated the speculative 
excesses of the system of forward dealing, ensured that the 1998 amendments stopped short of 
allowing demutualization. Similarly, the sheer volume of legislation involved in introducing 
(corporation-type) investment trusts meant that it proved impossible to include real estate 
investment trusts in the Big Bang program even though there had been calls for their introduction 
for some time.   
   This was followed in August 2001 by the Financial Services Agency's Program for Structural 
Reform of Japan's Securities Markets. From this point onwards it becomes increasingly clear that 
the capital market reforms that began with Japan's Big Bang were seen as helping to achieve one 
major historical goal: redirecting the flow of money in the economy. Born of a painful awareness of 
how retail investors had abandoned Japan's stock markets, the Structural Reform Program aimed 
to make them the key players on these markets (e.g., by establishing an institutional framework to 
restore public confidence, encouraging investment trust companies to provide more user-friendly 
products and promoting investor education) in the hope that this would help to correct the heavy 
weighting of retail investors' portfolios towards bank deposits.   
   The reform of income taxation related with securities transactions in Japan, which began in 
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investors, should also be seen in this context.   
   Although there were calls at one stage for one-off tax concessions, critics pointed out that 
limited concessions would prove counterproductive as they would only make the tax system more 
complicated. In the end it was decided to carry out a radical overhaul of the system of securities 
taxation with effect from 2003. As a result, capital gains and dividends from equity investments 
will be taxed at only 10% until 2008, and any capital losses can be carried forward for three years. 
Although the tax system has since been “tightened up” inasmuch as equity investors must now pay 
tax on their actual capital gains and are no longer able to elect to pay tax on a fixed percentage 
(2.5%) of the proceeds of a transaction instead, the fact that the tax rate has been slashed and the 
tax return form considerably simplified means that this has not deterred equity investors. The aim 
of all these tax reforms has been to treat securities investment in general and equity investment in 
particular more favorably than they have been treated in the past in comparison with traditional 
bank accounts—even at the risk of being accused of “favoring the well-off”—in the hope that this 
will induce a switch out of savings accounts into the stock market.   
   One document that is noteworthy for the decisiveness with which it called for reform of 
Japan's capital markets at this time in order to redirect the flow of money in the economy is the 
July 2002 report “A Blueprint for Japan's Financial System and Public Administration” produced 
by a special advisory panel to the Minister for Financial Services.
2) As well as pointing out the 
limitations of Japan's traditional industry-based financial model and the need for a more 
market-oriented system that will redirect the flow of money in the economy, the report makes a 
number of recommendations about the role the regulators can play in bringing this about.   
      A month later, in August 2002, a Program for Expediting Reform of Japan's Securities Markets 
was announced as a follow-up to the Structural Reform Program of the previous year and as a 
basis for more detailed discussion by the Financial System Council and the drafting of 
amendments to existing laws. The following year, 2003, saw even more radical reforms such as the 
introduction of a system of “securities intermediaries” (i.e., stockbroker agents) and the go-ahead 
for foreign stock exchanges to install trading terminals in Japan. Finally, the last year 2004, has 
seen the enactment of amendments to the Securities and Exchange Law that will, among other 
things, make issue prospectuses more effective, allow banks to act as agents for stockbrokers, 
abolish Article 37 of the Securities and Exchange Law (which requires any stockbroker wishing to 
execute an order to buy or sell listed shares off the exchange to obtain the express permission of 
the investor concerned in advance), require stockbrokers to execute orders on the best terms for 
their clients, and impose fines for irregular trading activity and inadequate disclosure.   
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II.    How Can the Flow of Money Be Redirected? 
 
II. 1.    Encouraging more participation by retail investors 
 
      Japan's capital markets are therefore still in the throes of reform despite the fact that a program 
as radical as Big Bang was acclaimed to be has been “implemented in full.” Nevertheless, the bulk of 
Japanese personal financial assets are still held in the form of bank deposits. Although the economy 
has recovered and the banks are better able to act as lenders now that they have disposed of the 
bulk of their nonperforming loans, there is still no sign of any significant switch to “direct” 
financing. A more market-oriented financial system still seems a pipe dream.   
   It is often argued that one of the main reasons for the lack of more tangible progress is the 
failure to encourage many more retail investors to invest in securities.
3) 
      This is partly because stockbrokers—perhaps because they have not tried hard enough—have 
traditionally been perceived in Japan as less accessible than banks and have failed to establish a 
reputation as investment advisers. It is also partly the result of the simple fact that stockbrokers 
have fewer outlets in Japan than banks. One of the reasons why, in 2003, a “securities 
intermediary” system was introduced whereby companies other than stockbrokers are allowed to 
act on behalf of stockbrokers (e.g., by helping customers to open securities trading accounts and 
offering them investment advice) was to increase stockbrokers' sales channels and make it easier 
for the man in the street to invest in securities. The decision since then to allow banks and other 
financial institutions to act as securities intermediaries was also motivated by the desire to create 
sales channels for stockbrokers that were perceived as more accessible by the man in the street.
4) 
      Another reason often given for the failure to encourage many more retail investors to invest in 
securities is a general lack of understanding of the role of securities markets and the various 
approaches and techniques available to investors.   
   This is particularly noticeable if one compares the situation in Japan with that in the United 
States, where the market plays a much more important role in the financial system. Following the 
collapse of Enron in November 2000, the United States was visited by a series of unprecedented 
corporate accounting scandals. However, with the full support of President Bush as head of state 
and with the cooperation of the Congress, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act and a number of other laws 
were passed in record time to deal with the problem. The swiftness of the response can be 
explained by the widely held view that America's capital markets are an important public good 
and a bastion of its economy.   
   In Japan, on the other hand, while there is a widespread understanding of the public nature 
           
3)    However, according to figures on share ownership from the Japanese stock exchanges, the percentage of shares owned 
by individual investors, which (in money terms) had continued to decline for most of the post-war period, rose for three 
years in succession after bottoming at 18.0% at the end of March 2000 and stood at 20.6% at the end of March 2003. It 
would therefore be inaccurate to say that individual investors in Japan have “deserted the market.” 
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and social significance of the country's banks, its capital markets in general and the stock market 
in particular tend to be disdainfully seen as a means of personal enrichment rather than a public 
institution. A good, albeit minor, example of this difference in attitude is the fact that the symbols 
used in maps and learnt by children at primary school include one for a bank as well as ones for a 
police station and a fire station but not ones for a stockbroker or a stock exchange. Not only does 
this illustrate how banks are viewed as a public institution in Japan but also just how much more 
familiar they are.   
   Improving investor education and fostering an awareness of the important role played by 
capital markets in the financial system (and, by extension, the national economy) are just as 
essential if more retail investors are to invest in securities as diversifying stockbrokers' sales 
channels is.   
 
II. 2.    Need for banks to behave more normally and to make greater use of securitization 
 
      Another reason for the lack of success in redirecting the flow of money in Japan lies with the 
banks, as the institutions responsible for “indirect” financing, rather than either the stock 
exchanges or stockbrokers. In a nutshell, the banks need to behave more normally.   
      It goes without saying that this means that the banks need to dispose of their nonperforming 
loans, which are still a millstone round their necks, before they can be given a clean bill of health 
and win back the confidence of the nation. Also, once the financial system has been stabilized, the 
blanket guarantee on bank deposits needs to be ended as planned in April 2005. Nor is that all. 
Once they have disposed of their nonperforming loans, banks should not revert to their old ways of 
blindly competing for corporate lending business and the bank deposits to finance this. Instead, 
they should seek new profit opportunities in the country's capital markets alongside other 
participants. Otherwise, they will only create another bad debt mountain to threaten the financial 
system.  
      This is because Japan's corporate sector has become a surplus unit, in terms of money flow, and 
is expected to remain in surplus for at least the next 10 years. This means that, even if the banks try 
to create more lending business, they cannot expect any significant increase in the demand for 
capital.
5)  Also, even though bank lending as a percentage of GDP has declined after doubling 
from 50% to 100% during the boom of the late 1980s, it is still higher than in the United States and 
some other countries. In other words, even if we ignore the question whether Japan has too many 
banks, there is no doubt at all that, in terms of the banks' lending capacity, the country is 
overbanked and that this is the reason for the excessive competition in the banking sector. It is 
this overbanking and this excessive competition that have made it impossible for Japanese banks 
to charge interest rates that reflect the risks they are incurring and thereby deprived them of the 
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profit opportunities that might have enabled them to bite the bullet and dispose of their 
nonperforming loans more quickly.   
   If, instead of facing up to the facts, the banks do not mend their ways and continue to offer 
loans aggressively at rates that fail to reflect their risks, borrowers in general and corporate 
borrowers in particular would be irrational not to rely on such loans, and it is difficult to see why 
they should make greater use of direct financing in the form, for example, of bonds and commercial 
paper. Strangely enough, even though banks are not usually considered key capital market players, 
whether or not Japan's capital markets expand will depend on whether the banks act out of 
self-interest and seek to increase their profits.   
      Closely connected with this is the need for more loan securitization so that risk is borne not 
just by the bank that carries out the initial credit analysis but by a wide range of parties and the 
price mechanism is allowed to function properly.   
      Although we have pointed out that, in terms of the economy as a whole, Japan is overbanked, it 
is also a fact that, at an industry level, the banks have been accused of being reluctant to lend and 
eager to call in those loans that they have made. This eagerness has been blamed for putting 
smaller companies out of business and for making Japan's recession only worse, and was one of the 
reasons why the Tokyo Metropolitan Government even considered setting up a bank of its own. 
Given the overall downtrend in bank lending, it will be difficult to prevent a situation where 
banks are never reluctant to lend or eager to recall loans even if their rates always match their risks. 
What such a situation requires is securitization as a means of linking indirect to direct financing.   
      There are many different types of securitized products, ranging from syndicated loans to loan 
participations, which are slightly more liquid, and asset-backed securities with names (such as 
collateralized loan obligations and collateralized debt obligations) that vary according to the 
pooled loan assets they use as collateral. What they have in common is the fact that their 
transparency and efficient pricing mechanisms have been the main reasons for their success. There 
will be no shortage of investors, especially institutions, both Japanese and non-Japanese, willing 
to invest their own money, even if it means taking a risk, so long as they know what they are 
investing in and that the asking price is reasonable.   
      In the past, legal and technical problems, such as the requirements that had to be satisfied in 
order to defend a claim on pooled assets such as loans and difficulties in setting up the companies 
and trusts that serve as vehicles for these assets, were often cited as the reason for the lack of 
progress in securitization in Japan. However, during the past 10 years considerable progress has 
been made in establishing the legal and institutional framework needed for securitization.   
      This is not, of course, to say that there are no unresolved issues (such as how to set up limited 
liability companies and limited partnerships like those in the United States where the owners or 
partners are exempt from corporate income tax in spite of their limited liability). Nor is an 
institutional framework in itself a guarantee of success: as industry practitioners sometimes point 
out, a system cannot be used if there are not enough people who know how to operate it.   10  S. Osaki / Public Policy Review 
 
      Another problem (and the biggest one facing the industry) is whether the loans and assets that 
constitute the bricks and mortar of securitized products will be supplied at prices that investors 
are willing to pay. This will depend on the banks, who are one of the main holders of loans and 
assets. Another important point is whether, in such a case, investors are given all the information 
they need.   
   Once securitization is accepted more widely, banks will have no alternative but to lend on 
terms that reflect their risk—if only to ensure that they do not incur a loss when the loans are sold. 
At the same time, investors will compare securitized products with instruments, such as bonds 
and commercial paper, that borrowers can issue themselves, and will be able to arbitrage between 
the two. As this pricing mechanism becomes increasingly accepted, not only should a virtuous 
cycle be formed where the market for securitized products expands even further but the cost of 
financing should also reflect the risk involved more closely and society's resources should be 
allocated more appropriately. This will lead to a more market-oriented financial system while still 
being “indirect financing” in the sense that it will still be the banks that lend the money. Such 
financing might well be called “market-oriented indirect financing.” Thus, while the banks have 
already put considerable effort into this by becoming increasingly involved in loan syndication and 
originating securitized products, this is, hopefully, only a start.
6) 
 
II. 3.    Respecting the role of secondary securities markets 
 
      If the banks are to behave more normally and securitize their loans, not only will they have to 
disclose adequate information about these assets but the prices of the corporate bonds and 
commercial paper on which these are based (as well as those of the government bonds that serve as 
a benchmark) will also have to be formed on liquid and efficient markets. Therefore, the price 
discovery mechanism of Japan's secondary securities markets will have to be utilized to the full if 
the market for securitized products is to expand.   
   On the primary market for both new and secondary securities offerings, where issuers and 
investors trade directly, prices (and not just those of securitized products) are basically formed by 
direct negotiation between the counterparties. Direct negotiation is not, of course, the only type of 
price formation possible: it is also possible to conceive of a process where a stockbroker acting as a 
specialist intermediary uses book building or open tender to reflect the views of a wide range of 
investors in the direct negotiations.   
      However, the most reliable and efficient way of discounting a large amount of information in a 
price is to conduct transactions on a liquid secondary market and to use the price formed there as a 
point of reference. A good example of this is capital increases at market prices by listed companies. 
           
6)    The author is indebted to Professor Ken'ya Fujiwara for pointing out some examples of how the market function is 
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Even in the case of financial products (such as corporate bonds) whose secondary market is 
relatively immature, prices can be formed (i.e., terms fixed) by assuming a spread over government 
bonds that reflects the creditworthiness of the issuer.   
      Even in the case of financial products (such as securitized products) where secondary markets 
are still few and far between, prices can be formed fairly and efficiently by using as a benchmark 
prices discovered on existing secondary and derivative markets for other securities. In the case of 
securitized products, prices can be formed using the secondary market for government bonds as a 
benchmark in the same way as in the case of corporate bonds so long as there is a third-party 
credit rating. Therefore, while a secondary market is an important price discovery mechanism, this 
does not mean that there has to be a secondary market for every financial product.
7)  Similarly, 
even in the case of typical negotiated transactions such as bank loans and private placements, a 
true and fair price can be set using a spread over a benchmark such as a government bond yield or 
an interbank rate. Indeed, not even marketability is an absolute condition for using the capital 
markets' price discovery mechanism.   
   In other words, secondary securities markets do not exist simply to enable profit-seekers to 
cash in their securities and take their profits. They also perform a very public role by enabling 
buyers and sellers to discover the price of financial products, thereby ensuring an efficient flow of 
money in the economy.   
      However, we need to realize that, although price information from related markets can be used 
to derive a price for financial products without any market of their own, the price derived may be 
neither fair nor efficient if the related markets are small and illiquid, and if either the products 
traded or the participants trading them lack diversity.   
   Let us take the example of credit derivatives, trading in which has increased in recent years. 
Although they enable market participants to price credit risk, it has been pointed out that the 
borrowers that are the real object of the trading are all major international companies.
8)  1 3   T h i s  
means that it is inappropriate to use the prices formed on credit derivative markets to measure the 
risk of lending to companies (especially smaller companies) in particular countries or areas. We 
need to realize that, when we talk about using secondary market prices to reflect market 
perceptions in negotiated transactions such as bank loans, the scope for this approach is actually 
quite limited. Therefore, while it may be possible to discover such prices by establishing credit 
derivative markets for particular geographical areas and sizes of company, limited participation is 
likely to mean that pricing will be inefficient and costs prohibitive.   
      However, a more fundamental problem is the fact that in Japan people do not fully appreciate 
the importance of the role played by secondary securities markets. For example, many of those 
           
7)    This point is frequently misunderstood in Japan. One example of this is the argument that, if you want to issue more 
junk bonds, you need to establish a “market” (i.e. some sort of exchanges) for that purpose. In fact, so long as prices reflect 
market conditions, plenty of investors will be willing to invest in such bonds after discounting the effect of their low 
liquidity, regardless of whether or not they are traded on a large and organized secondary market. 
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who do acknowledge the importance of the stock market believe strongly that it exists to provide 
capital to growth companies and that rampant speculation should therefore be discouraged. 
Underlying this view appears to be the belief that the primary market is the real capital market, 
that the secondary market exists so that investors in new issues can cash in their investments and 
that it would be a mistake to try to extend this role. Those who overemphasize the importance of 
long-term investment on the grounds that equities and investment trusts should be held for the 
long term probably share this view.   
      While one can understand why some people disapprove of secondary market volatility caused 
by short-term traders engaged in a money game, it is actually impossible to draw a hard and fast 
line between speculation and investment. Unless it is a wash sale (prohibited under the Securities 
and Exchange Law as “market manipulation”), where there is effectively no exchange of either cash 
or securities, short-term trading (including short selling) is a perfectly respectable economic 
activity that contributes to price discovery and market liquidity however it may be labeled.   
      Let us take the example of short selling, the regulation of which in Japan has been the subject 
of heated debate and which some people even consider to be a sure but illicit bet. In fact, short 
selling is a perfectly proper type of transaction based on the view that the current market price is 
too high. An increase in short selling signals that some investors consider the market overpriced. If 
they are wrong, they will have to buy back the securities concerned at a higher price and realize a 
loss. Nobody else loses out.   
      Basically, anyone who invests in a growth company for the medium to long term is speculating 
inasmuch as we cannot predict the future with any degree of certainty. If taking a punt for a week 
or an hour is speculation and therefore reprehensible, taking a punt on what is going to happen to 
the price of something over a period of 10 years is surely speculation and reprehensible. Securities 
markets are places where buyers and sellers place short-, medium- and long-term bets on the 
basis of a wide variety of information and thereby play an important role in price discovery.   
      In Japan, particularly during the past few years, many people have demanded “action” against 
share prices that they believed were too low. It is probably simplistic to believe that the price 
discovery mechanism will always function properly just because there happens to be a stock 
market or stock exchange somewhere. There will always be different views at any one time about 
what is a fair share price. However, so long as a market is free of irregular trading activities such as 
insider trading and manipulation and investors can count on a certain degree of liquidity, it will be 
very difficult to make the case that the government should intervene in the national interest 
because the prices on that market are too low.   
      In the past few years there has been a heated debate in Japan about whether action is needed to 
revitalize the stock market. Compared with the early 1990s, however, the market's daily turnover 
ratio (daily trading value ÷ market capitalization) has actually increased. Companies are able to 
make initial public offerings and rights issues, and it is no longer the case, as it was in 1992, when 
no initial public offerings were allowed, that companies are unable to raise capital there. Even   S. Osaki / Public Policy Review  13 
 
when the Nikkei 225 Average declined to the 8,000 level, the stock market was still functioning 
properly. Perhaps those who demanded action to revitalize the market really only wanted to see 
share prices higher and were less interested in boosting turnover or increasing efficiency for their 
own sake.   
      This is not to say, of course, that a falling stock market is a good thing. Inasmuch as the stock 
market reflects economic activity, a sustained decline in share prices should be seen as a danger 
signal for the economy. The only proper action that should be taken to combat low share prices is 
for companies to convince investors that their strategies and approaches will boost both current 
and future earnings. Simply setting up a body to control the short-term demand and supply of 
shares or modifying accounting standards will not help share prices in the medium term. Now that 
investor confidence has improved, it would be a good time for Japan's financial authorities to 
reaffirm that their basic policy is to trust the market's own pricing mechanism and to fine-tune 
economic policy with one eye on any danger signals coming from the market while refraining as 
much as possible from intervention.   
 
II. 4.    Preventing irregular trading activity 
 
      In order to ensure that the market pricing mechanism continues to function properly, irregular 
trading activity needs to be monitored more carefully and investor trust needs to be restored. 
Japan's Big Bang program is generally credited with having brought about an epoch-making 
change in the authorities' attitude to regulating the country's securities markets: from one of 
deterrence to one of detection. This is not to deny that there are those who question whether the 
current level of monitoring and supervision by the Securities and Exchange Surveillance 
Commission and the Financial Services Agency is adequate.   
   Detection is all very well, but it is poor consolation to those who find themselves victims of 
fraudsters and unscrupulous operators and will only destroy investors' trust in the market. A case 
in point is that of the Internet operator MTCI, whose premises were searched by agents of the 
Tokyo Public Prosecutor's Office in November 2002 on suspicion of having submitted a false 
registration statement when it made a public offering in October 1999. In July 2003 the former 
chairman of the company was found guilty and sentenced to two years' imprisonment with hard 
labor by the Tokyo District Court. However, it is difficult to see what can be done to help the 
victims four years after the company obtained their money on false pretences.   
   Compared with fraud, which is a criminal offence, violations of the Securities and Exchange 
Law such as making false entries in registration documents and the failure to send issue 
prospectuses have more in common with procedural offences and should be easier to detect and 
prove. Even if detection can only be after the event, the authorities need to step up their 
monitoring and efforts at detection in order to limit the damage caused by such offences.   
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enforcement powers (such as civil injunction proceedings and civil penalties) which the Financial 
Services Agency and the Securities and Exchange Surveillance Commission do not have (or cannot 
use). Some improvement can be expected in this respect now that the latest (2004) amendments 
to the Securities and Exchange Law have been enacted enabling civil fines to be imposed for illegal 
trading activity such as insider dealings and market manipulation. Nevertheless, it should not be 
forgotten that the extent to which these agencies can use their detection powers also depends very 
much on the quality of their staff and how they are organized, and that an institutional framework 
alone is not enough.   
 
III.    Reforming Japan's Capital Markets: The Road Ahead 
 
   At one time it was possible to identify shortcomings in Japan's capital markets and suggest 
solutions to them simply by comparing Japan's capital markets with their more advanced 
counterparts in the United States and the United Kingdom. Some excellent reform programs have 
been drawn up simply by recommending that systems that existed in the United States and the 
United Kingdom but not in Japan be introduced while some that existed in Japan but not in the 
United States and the United Kingdom be abolished. However, since the Big Bang program and the 
series of reforms that have followed it, Japan's capital markets have undergone a radical change. In 
many (at least, formal) respects, they can now bear comparison with their US and UK 
counterparts.  
      There are, of course, some unresolved issues. The main one is the fact that, under the Securities 
and Exchange Law and other existing legislation, investor protection in Japan is limited in scope 
and outdated. The reason for this is that the Securities and Exchange Law defines “(marketable) 
securities” by listing a limited number of examples. This means that any investors who purchased a 
new financial product not listed in the Law's definition of “(marketable) securities” would not be 
fully protected by the Law's provisions.   
      This issue was confronted once in the course of the debate that accompanied the reforms that 
followed Big Bang. In the end, all that came of it was an unsatisfactory compromise in the form of 
the Financial Products Sales Law. The issue was raised once again, in December 2003, when the 
First Subcommittee of the Financial System Council submitted its report “Towards a 
Market-Oriented Financial System.” The report recommended that a solution be sought 
independently of the Securities and Exchange Law by enacting an “Investment Services Law.” 
While such a major reform clearly cannot be enacted overnight, progress will hopefully be rapid.   
      Of the various issues mentioned earlier in this paper, the enactment of an “Investment Services 
Law” is most closely related to those of encouraging greater participation by retail investors and 
preventing irregular trading activity. As far as the other issues mentioned earlier are concerned, the 
need for banks to mend their ways and the need for greater use of securitization have more to do 
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framework and do not lend themselves to discussion under the heading of institutional reform. 
The same is probably true of the need to establish more secondary markets in securities. The 
institutional framework within which Japan's secondary markets have to operate is now quite 
sophisticated. Indeed, now that the latest (2004) amendments to the Securities and Exchange Law 
have been enacted, it is difficult to identify any serious shortcomings in this framework. If any 
shortcomings do exist, they are more likely to be found in the basic attitude of those who created 
and operate the institutional framework or those who participate in and use Japan's securities 
markets.  
      Ever since the Securities and Exchange Law was enacted after the Second World War, Japan's 
capital markets have been based on the US principle that companies should be required to disclose 
all the information that investors need in order to make their decisions and that investors should 
therefore take responsibility for those decisions. Trading on Japan's securities markets is 
unrestricted (unless it involves unfair practices such as fraud, insider dealing or manipulation), 
and there are no restrictions on who may trade. Similarly, companies and other issuers of securities 
are supposed to be free of any restrictions on what securities they may issue and offer on the 
secondary market so long as they satisfy any disclosure requirements.   
   In fact, however, this freedom is a façade. In reality, the authorities have often imposed 
regulations that have severely restricted eligibility to issue securities or to purchase particular 
types of securities.   
      The most extreme example of this was regulation of the corporate bond market, especially by 
means of bond issuance standards administered by a group of banks and stockbroking companies 
acting as trustees and underwriters (the so-called Kisaikai or “Bond Issuance Committee”)—a 
system that was finally abolished in January 1996. A further deterrent was to make the 
denominations of corporate bonds too large for retail investors. Another example was the 
so-called “No Return” rule, which, until the mid-1980s, limited the issue amount of private 
placements to ¥2 billion per issue and prohibited companies that had made a public offering from 
making a private placement again—all in the name of “fostering the growth of public offerings.” 
Similar restrictions (on issuers and denominations) were imposed for the same reason when the 
markets for commercial paper and securitized products were established.   
   Although less restricted than either the corporate bond or the commercial paper market, the 
stock market was also for many years subject to regulations that were not in keeping with the 
spirit of the law. One example is the regulation that prohibited companies that failed to satisfy the 
very demanding listing requirements from offering new shares to the public. As far as the rules of 
the Securities and Exchange Law are concerned, any company that has filed a registration 
statement and fulfilled its disclosure obligations may make either primary or secondary share 
offerings regardless of whether it qualifies for a listing. In fact, the first time that an unlisted 
Japanese company was allowed to offer new shares to the public was in May 1984, when Sanko 
registered on the deregulated OTC market. Even then, until 11 years later, in July 1995, when a 16  S. Osaki / Public Policy Review 
 
second section of the OTC market was established, no loss-making company was allowed to go 
public even if it had disclosed its loss-making status.   
   The reason why this discrepancy between the spirit of the law and how the system was 
actually administered lasted for so long was probably that many of those in authority and many 
experts were deeply suspicious of the disclosure system that forms the basis of Japan's capital 
markets, however well they may have understood it in theory. In other words, they probably 
believed that, no matter how good the disclosure system might be, at the end of the day retail 
investors would be unable to judge for themselves and that, since the stockbrokers and investment 
advisors that acted as intermediaries between investors and the market would only try to take 
advantage of investors, the only proper way to protect investors was to reduce the number of risky 
investment opportunities available to them.   
      Today, when it is generally accepted that markets should normally be unrestricted, such views 
are seldom aired in public. In fact, however, many people are probably still sympathetic to such 
views even in the post-Big Bang world. The “action” that many people have demanded in recent 
years against share prices that they believed were too low (see above) almost certainly reflected an 
authoritarian desire to justify arbitrary intervention against the workings of the market.   
      Although many of the restrictive regulations that were imposed on Japan's capital markets in 
the past were imposed in the name of “investor protection,” the effect was only to limit the options 
available to companies looking to raise capital and to deprive investors of a wide range of 
investment opportunities. Until the 1990s Japanese investors generally had only an extremely 
limited range of securities (mainly government bonds and listed stocks) to choose from. It is 
therefore hardly surprising that their portfolios were heavily weighted towards postal and bank 
savings accounts. For their part, Japanese companies had no alternative but to rely on bank loans, 
thereby ensuring the continuing dominance of indirect financing. Whether or not future reforms of 
Japan's capital markets succeed in making the financial system more market-oriented will depend 
partly on whether the experts and those in authority are really able to discard their authoritarian 
ways of thinking.   
      It will also depend on the attitude of the companies that depend more than anyone else on the 
capital markets for their funds.   
      Ever since the 1980s big Japanese companies have endeavored to improve their competitiveness, 
their credit ratings and their brand recognition; but they have also sought to reduce their reliance 
on bank loans. This has enabled them to free themselves from the trammels of being constantly 
monitored by their bank. Their main means of achieving this has been to use the Eurobond market 
and the Japanese stock market as alternative sources of finance. Not only have these attempts to 
diversify been quite successful: they have also led the banks to lend at rates well below the market 
rate in order to hold onto their big corporate clients. As we saw earlier, this is one of the reasons 
why Japanese lending rates have long failed to reflect the true degree of risk incurred.   
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blinded by short-term gain and ignored their need to diversify their sources of funding in the 
medium to long term. One example of this is Japan's commercial paper market, which should be an 
alternative to bank loans for working capital. Such has been the variation in issue amounts as a 
result of interest rate volatility that the market has been unable to expand steadily. Similarly, the 
Japanese corporate bond market, which, until recently, had been growing while bank lending 
marked time, has actually started to contract now that the banks' nonperforming loans have begun 
to decline. This shows that companies are using the capital markets as a means of adapting to 
changes in bank lending rates.   
      In the United States, on the other hand, most big companies have an ongoing commercial paper 
issuance program that enables them to obtain funds from a wide range of investors regardless of 
any changes in bank lending rates. One of their reasons for this is that they believe that having a 
wide range of sources and methods of finance is essential to their risk management if they are to 
have ready access to working capital.   
      This is not, of course, to say that big US companies think they can do without banks. For big 
companies with an ongoing commercial paper issuance program banks can offer back-up credit 
when choppy conditions on the commercial paper market make refunding difficult. In addition, 
they perform a vital daily role as links in the payments system.   
      Even though it is more than three years since Japan's Big Bang program was fully implemented 
and the country's capital markets appear to have a comprehensive institutional framework, the 
desired effect will not be achieved unless those in authority discard their authoritarian ways of 
thinking and companies adopt a different attitude. To use a well worn saying, it might be said of 
Japan's capital markets that, although the field has been ploughed, there is still a risk that the 




In addition to the literature referred to in the text, readers may wish to refer to the following: 
 
Kazuto Ikeo, “Ginko wa Naze Kawarenai no ka” [Why Do Banks Find It So Difficult to Change?], 
Chuo Koron Shinsha, 2003.   
Masataka Maeda, “Konna Kabushiki Shijo ni Dare ga Shita” [Who Made the Stock Market What 
It Is?], Nihon Keizai Shimbunsha, 2003.   
Yoshimasa Nishimura, “Nihon no Kin'yu Seido Kaikaku” [Reforming Japan's Financial System], 
Toyo Keizai Shinposha, 2003.   
Sadakazu Osaki, “Kin'yu Kozo Kaikaku no Gosan” [Some of the Mistakes Made in Reforming 
Japan's Financial System], Toyo Keizai Shinposha, 2003.   
First Subcommittee of the Financial System Council's Sectional Committee on the Financial 
System, “Shijo Kino o Chukaku to Suru Kin'yu Shisutemu ni Mukete” [Towards a Market-Based 
Financial System], December 2003.   
 
 